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Abstract
Why doesn’t capital ﬂow to developing countries as predicted by the neoclassical model?
What are the direction and degree of capital misallocation across nations? We revisit these
questions by removing public capital from total capital to achieve a more accurate estimate of
the marginal productivity of private capital. We calculate MPK schedules in a large sample of
advanced and developing countries. Our main result is that, in terms of the Lucas paradox,
private capital is allocated remarkably eﬃciently across nations. Tentative estimates of the
marginal productivity of public capital suggest that the deadweight loss from public capital
misallocation across countries can be much larger than the one from private capital.
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1 Introduction
If capital-labor ratios are low in poor countries and returns high as the standard one-sector growth
model predicts, why doesn’t more capital ﬂow from rich to poor countries? This fundamental
question known as the Lucas Paradox, coined after Lucas’ (1990) seminal paper, is a focal point for
many key areas of economic development, whether the eﬃcacy of aid, the extent of international
capital market frictions, or the importance of institutions and complementary factors. The paradox
pre-supposes a downward-sloping ﬁnancial return to investment in the cross-section of nations.
Lucas himself posited that the explanation could be that of failing to account for complementary
factors to physical capital, such as human capital, resulting in an overstating of the MPK. Lucas
placed little credence on the argument of capital market frictions.1
The aggregate MPK is the most common measure employed to approximate the return to in-
vestment. Unfortunately estimating the MPK is no easy task (e.g., see Banerjee and Duﬂo, 2005,
for a review). In a persuasive, yet provocative, contribution to the literature, Caselli and Feyrer
(2007) (CF from hereafter) propose a measurement approach based on development accounting.
More speciﬁcally, they present the case for direct MPK estimation using easily accessible macroeco-
nomic data, namely, the income share of capital, GDP, and the value of the capital stock.2 Their
approach assumes competitive markets and imposes no restrictions on production functions other
than that of constant returns to scale.
CF’s main contribution is that they derive an MPK measure that is more suitable for the
purpose of international credit ﬂows. They modify the standard MPK derived from the one-sector
growth model to remove natural resource rents from the income share of capital and correct for
higher relative costs of capital in poor countries. By making these two reasonable adjustments,
Lucas Paradox resolved, CF ﬁnd that the cross-country MPK is roughly ﬂat, and the overall
eﬃciency loss due to capital misallocation is only 0.1% of global GDP.3 Yet CF’s measure is based
1 In a recent contribution, Gourinchas and Jeanne (2013) argue that international capital ﬂows move towards
developing countries with lower (not higher) productivity growth. While the Lucas Paradox is about the small
magnitude of capital inﬂows to developing countries, the “allocation puzzle”, as coined by Gourinchas and Jeanne,
is about the allocation of the already small size of capital ﬂows across developing countries. Nevertheless, Alfaro et
al. (2014) suggest that the allocation puzzle is entirely driven by sovereign-to-sovereign transactions.
2Taylor (1998) measures the MPK similarly for Argentina, and Bai et al. (2006) use a similar approach to measure
the return to capital (both in aggregate and by sector/region) in China, though they use current price data to measure
PY Y/PKK rather than real data followed by a price adjustment as in CF.
3Having said that, other adjustments can be suggested which in principle have the ability to overturn the result of
a ﬂat MPK. Chirinko and Mallick (2008) draw attention to the role played by adjustment costs, ﬁnding that a large
MPK diﬀerential re-emerges once adjustment costs are accounted for.
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on a capital stock that includes both public and private components, whereas the relevant MPK
for investors is only the return to private capital. Consequently, in this paper, we attempt to go
beyond CF by striping out public capital from total capital to achieve a more accurate estimate
of the marginal productivity of private capital. An additional goal from our analysis is to shed
light on the allocation of public capital across countries; although as will become clear later, our
estimates of the marginal productivity of public capital are more tentative and based on ad-hoc
and harder-to-verify assumptions.
More speciﬁcally, we look at the diﬀerence between the total and the private MPKs, and at
the public MPK. We study the shape of their estimates with respect to income per capita in the
cross-section of countries and the percentage loss in global GDP due to the possible misallocation
of both types of capital. The private MPK is calculated as a straightforward extension of the
methodology proposed by CF. The calculation of the public MPK is, on the other hand, more
problematic because national accounts do not provide any net income from public capital because
the government sector performs a non-market activity. Therefore, in order to measure the share of
public capital in output, we follow two approaches. First, like in Cooley and Prescott (1995), we
assume that the net rate of return between private and public investment is the same;4 we see this
case as the most conservative that provides a possible minimum value of the deadweight loss due
to public-capital misallocation. Second, we employ regression estimates of the output-elasticity of
public capital.
Our work follows Pritchett (2000) and Caselli (2005), among others, who argue for the future
separation of public and private investment in the context of development accounting. These
authors thought that data issues would make it near impossible to convincingly estimate the private
and public MPK. One main contribution of this paper is to break the impasse and carry out this
exercise for the ﬁrst time. For that purpose, we employ improved data on the sectoral share of
investment from IMF’s World Economic Outlook (WEO).
The distinction between the two types of capital is important for at least two reasons. The ﬁrst
one stems from the observed variation of public investment across nations. As Table 1 and Figure
1 show, the public sector plays a disproportionately large role in investment in developing countries
compared to advanced economies — the relationship looks more ﬂat when public investment as
a percentage of GDP is considered because investment as a proportion of GDP rises in income.
4We thank a referee for suggesting this exercise.
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Figure 1: The Composition of Investment
Table 1: The Composition of Public Investment
Variable LICs∗ MICs† Advanced
Mean Public Share in Total Investment (2010) 42.6% 29.4% 16.6%
Mean Public Investment as % of GDP (2007) 6.0% 6.9% 3.9%
Source: World Economic Outlook, Penn World Tables
∗LICs: low income countries
†MICs: middle income countries
Therefore, eliminating the public capital component of the overall MPK to obtain the private MPK
can have important implications for the slope of the MPK.
The second reason is that the theory behind MPK determination is likely to diﬀer signiﬁcantly
between the two sectors. There is much literature elsewhere with results that hinge on the contrast-
ing behavioral idiosyncrasies of public and private agents (e.g., Becker 1957, Fama 1980, Pritchett
2000, Besley and Burgess 2002, Robinson and Torvik 2005).5 Governments probably follow ob-
jective functions that do not only take into account eﬃciency considerations but also rent capture
and redistributive and other policies. If the public sector maximizes an entirely diﬀerent objec-
tive function compared to the private sector, capital allocation and the resulting MPK should be
determined diﬀerently.
An important implication of these diﬀerent behaviors is that a tight equalization between the
5Robinson and Torvik (2005), for example, aim to explain why governments don’t act like proﬁt maximizers when
it comes to investing. In particular, the model explains the political motivation behind the construction of white
elephants. Politicians construct these ineﬃcient projects when they ﬁnd it diﬃcult to make credible promises to
political supporters. The general point of this and other political economy models is that governments are driven
more by an electoral motive than by a proﬁt motive.
Public and Private MPK 4
public and private MPKs should not be expected; neither among the public MPK shown by diﬀerent
nations. Nevertheless, we argue that by comparing the productivity of the public input, we can
improve our understanding about the eﬃciency of the cross-country allocation of public capital.
We think of the private and public sectors as making diﬀerent types of investment. The pub-
lic sector tends to invest in production infrastructure such as roads, ports, airports, railways and
energy-transportation grids, goods where markets fail. As a consequence, public and private capital
should be considered imperfect substitutes in a country’s production function (CF implicitly con-
sidered them to be perfect substitutes). The fact that no net income from public capital is reﬂected
in national accounts and the non-rival nature of public goods lead us to incorporate private inputs
into the production function as being characterized by constant returns, and public capital as a
complementary factor that induces increasing returns.
The analysis is carried out in a broad sample composed of twenty six advanced economies and
forty two developing countries that is taken from Monge-Naranjo et al. (2016) (MSS from now on).
The reason for adopting the MSS sample is that they construct estimates of the income share of
reproducible capital by directly employing natural-resource rents that represent an improvement of
the measure of the income share of natural resources used by CF. Using these new share estimates,
MSS revise the CF misallocation results but focusing only on overall capital.
Most of our results are driven by a strongly positively sloped and highly dispersed ratio of output
to public capital. In particular, we ﬁnd that the overall MPK is ﬂat and the private one slightly
downward sloping; although following MSS when we split the sample using an openness indicator,
economies classiﬁed as closed depict upward frictions in the ﬂow of private capital. The analysis also
shows that, whereas the cross-country dispersion of the overall MPK has not changed much from
1990 to 2005, the one of the private MPK has decreased rapidly (mainly in developing nations).
This has contributed to ameliorate the global output loss due to private-capital misallocation, which
in our sample for the year 2005 is only about 1.9 percent, a number that is larger than the one
found by CF for 1996 but still relatively small. Hence, in terms of the Lucas paradox, our results
suggest that private capital is allocated remarkably eﬃciently.
The analysis yields another interesting result — albeit more tentative due to the strong assump-
tions employed to compute the public MPK. In all nations, but especially in developing countries,
the marginal productivity of public capital varies much more than its private counterpart, which
implies a potentially much greater misallocation in public than in private capital. This implication
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is supported by our calculations. In the counterfactual exercises conducted, the cost of capital
misallocation is about 4.5 times larger for the public component than for the private one. All in
all, our ﬁndings point to public sector frictions as a key constraint to enhancing the MPK and
accelerating international capital inﬂows.
We proceed as follows. Section 2 takes a close look at the primary sources of the data used to
disaggregate total capital into its public and private components and discusses the steps followed
to calculate the public and private MPK. Section 3 presents the new trends on the private MPK
unravelled from the data disaggregation, and compare them to CF’s overall MPK measure. Section
4 introduces the results for the public MPK and discusses its implications. Section 5 calculates
the worldwide deadweight loss that can be attributed to private and public capital misallocation.
Robustness checks that split the countries into open and closed are performed in section 6. Section
7 concludes.
2 Data
In this section we show in detail the steps followed to construct the private and public marginal
product of capital. Following CF, suppose that there are J ﬁnal goods in the economy, including
capital and consumption products. In any one of these sectors, let us say sector i, production
occurs using a set of complementary inputs that include private capital (Kpi), public capital (Kgi),
and other factors (Xi) according to
Yi = K
γ
giF (Kpi, Xi). (1)
The role of public capital in production could be indirect, if the public sector provides a ﬂow of
services to the private economy, instead of a stock of capital. In this case, government’s output
would represent an intermediate input, and we could think of the above production function as a
reduced form.
Suppose as well that F displays constant returns to scale over Kpi and Xi, γ > 0, and there
is perfect competition in all markets. These assumptions are made for the sake of simplicity, and
their only purpose is to guarantee that private capital exclusively obtains the value of its marginal
product in return for its service to the production activity. Nevertheless, we notice that perfect
competition might not constitute a good representation of market structure, especially in LICs;
and that the constant returns assumption implies, as a by-product, that public capital enters the
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production function as a TFP-enhancing variable.
If the available amount of capital is allocated eﬃciently among sectors, it must hold that
PjMPKPj = PiMPKPi, and PjMPKGj = PiMPKGi, for all i and j; where Pi is the price
of good i; and MPKPi and MPKGi represent the marginal product of private and public capital
in sector i, respectively.6 Under this premise, the return to one unit of income invested in public
and private capital employed in a given sector is the same across all ﬁnal-good industries. Let
us denote by MPKP and MPKG these common private and public capital returns, respectively.
Focusing on sector i and abstracting from capital gains, we can write:
MPKP =
Pi MPKPi
Pkp
, and MPKG =
Pi MPKGi
Pkg
; (2)
where Pkp and Pkg give the price of private and public capital.
One additional step is needed to obtain the private MPK. Notice that income that should be
attributed to Kp equals:
J
j=1 PjMPKPjKpj. Hence, we can write capital income derived from
its private component as: PiMPKPiKp; where Kp =
J
j=1Kpj is the stock of private capital. In
addition, if β denotes the share of private capital in aggregate output, we obtain that
β =
PiMPKPiKp
PyY
; (3)
where PyY is the value of GDP. Combining the last two equalities, it is straightforward to get an
expression for this common return as
MPKP = β
PyY
PkpKp
. (4)
The derivation of the public MPK, in turn, uses the Cobb-Douglas form assumed for public
capital in the production function. In particular, using expression (2) we can write that MPKG ∗
Pkg
J
j=1Kgj = γ
J
j=1 Pj Yj , which implies that
MPKG = γ
PyY
PkgKg
; (5)
where Kg is the stock of public capital in the economy. Notice that even though the Cobb-Douglas
form given to the public capital input is instrumental to obtain (5), it is completely irrelevant for
expression (4).
6As previously mentioned, when the government provides services, it may not be equalizing returns among indus-
trial activities or across regions (e.g., through ethnic favoritism). The equalization of returns across diﬀerent sectors
may not be fully appropriate for the private sector either. For instance, if capital is heterogenous diﬀerent sectors
might use a diﬀerent composition of capital goods, and then the rate of returns on two diﬀerent composite capital
stocks would not need to be equalized. Nevertheless, the equalization of returns should help to shed light on the
allocation of capital across countries.
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A key issue is how to calculate β and γ. The parameter β represents the share of private capital
in GDP and can be easily obtained from national accounts data. The output elasticity of public
capital γ, on the other hand, cannot be derived in that way as will be explained shortly, and then
we resort to counterfactual and regression estimates. Next, we focus on the calculation of β and
the description of the data. The discussion on possible estimates of γ is postponed to section 4.
To get estimates of β we can directly employ the share of reproducible capital in GDP from the
national income accounts. This approach implicitly assumes that all income attributed to capital
in national accounts comes from private capital. Although not completely correct, this is a fairly
accurate approximation. To see this notice that national accounts collect data on private sector
output (sales plus the change in inventory levels) and costs (intermediate inputs and labour costs)
to calculate capital income in the private sector. The return on capital or operating surplus is then
calculated as the diﬀerence between output and the costs. In contrast, government accounts are
solely based on the costs incurred because the public sector performs a non-market activity, hence
does not have sales. As a result, the only capital income which is attributed to public capital in
the national accounts is the consumption of ﬁxed capital (i.e., depreciation). Put diﬀerently, given
that ﬁrms do not pay for the services provided by public capital, all capital income generated by
reproducible capital except depreciation of public capital is, by construction, paid to the owners of
private capital.7
Our country sample employed to estimate the MPKs is taken from MSS. It is comprised by 68
countries with private and overall MPK data in 2005 — the latest year for which the MSS shares
of capital are available. We also look at time series data from 1990 to 2005, with the number of
nations beginning at 66, increasing to 67 from 1993, and to 68 from 2000. We measure the cross-
country MPK using current price local currency data from World Development Indicators (WDI),
rather than real data from Penn World Tables (PWT) adjusted for relative price diﬀerences as in
CF. The use of current price local currency data is preferred here since it side-steps any reliance on
PPP adjustments and extrapolated ICP data shown to be quite unstable for non-OECD countries
(see Johnson et al., 2013). In addition, it has been argued elsewhere (e.g. Knowles, 2001) that
7An implication of this last paragraph is that, in order to get the private MPK using expression (4), we should
subtract: (i) the depreciation of public capital from GDP in the numerator; and (ii) the share of Kg depreciation
from the share of reproducible capital to obtain β. These modiﬁcations, however, do not change signiﬁcantly the
results (available from the authors upon request). The reason is that the depreciation of public capital — that is, the
gross operating surplus of the general government in national accounts — amounts to only 2.36 percent of GDP on
average in our sample, with a relatively low standard deviation.
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investment shares are more accurately measured using local price data, rather than data from
PWT. In any case, for our analysis the two approaches yield essentially the same results. The data
we require are: income shares of private capital and government operating surplus (αk, αg), GDP
in current price local currency (PyY ), private capital (PkpKp), and public capital (PkgKg).
Current price local currency data on GDP and investment are taken from WDI. In principle,
capital series could be obtained by using the perpetual inventory method on current price historic
investment data, deﬂating the past capital stock each year by a sector-speciﬁc investment deﬂator
(see expression (6)). This deﬂator should diﬀer between the two sectors because government invest-
ment is largely based on structures and equipment while items like software, whose price shows a
steeper trend than other investment items, have more weight on the private sector. Unfortunately,
in practice only a common investment deﬂator exists for both private and public ﬁgures, which is the
one that we apply to the investment series.8 This investment deﬂator is derived from WDI data as
100*(current-price local-currency gross ﬁxed capital formation/constant-price local-currency gross
ﬁxed capital formation). Missing constant investment data is set equal to the product of constant
price GDP and gross ﬁxed capital formation as a proportion of GDP, for countries with available
data.
With current and constant price investment numbers, the next step is to split these investment
ﬂows into their private and public sector constituents. This split is crucial as it drives the resulting
diﬀerences in the private, public and total MPK. To do this disaggregation, we use private and
public investment share data from the World Economic Outlook (WEO). For the sample of 50
countries in 2006, the mean number of time series observations of the private investment share is
33 (ranging from a minimum of 12 to a maximum of 49).9 Before total investment is disaggregated,
the ﬁrst available observation of the investment share is extrapolated back to the ﬁrst year of
investment data.
In the absence of any investment data at all prior to 1960, it is necessary to set initial conditions
for both the public and private capital stocks. As is common practice (given the notion of a steady-
state capital stock), we set the initial condition, Kj0, to Ij0/(gj + δj0) where private and public
8 It is possible, though, to ﬁnd price indices for diﬀerent types of capital. PWT, for example, oﬀers diﬀerent price
indices for four categories: residential and non-residential structures; machinery and (non-transport) equipment;
transport equipment; and other assets. However, it is not clear how to go from these categories into private and
public capital.
9For seven countries (Austria, Denmark, Spain, Greece, Ireland, Jamaica and Sweden) investment share data was
missing from the latest WEO. We opted to take the share data from WEO 2003, using forecasted shares for the years
2004-2008.
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sectors are indexed by j = p, g. Ij0 is current price investment in the ﬁrst year available, gj is
the country- and sector-speciﬁc average growth rate of constant price investment over the ﬁrst
twenty years of available data,10 δj0 is the relevant depreciation rate for the ﬁrst year of available
investment data. Caselli (2005) shows that suﬃciently recent capital measures tend to be insensitive
to the exact assumptions made on these initial conditions.
In principle, time- and country-speciﬁc depreciation rates would be preferred. However, as far
as we know, those rates for a suﬃciently large number of countries in our sample are not available.
Instead, we follow Kamps (2006) and Gupta et al. (2014) to choose the depreciation rates employed
in the construction of the capital series. Using U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis data, Kamps
estimates a time-varying depreciation rate that increases gradually from 2.5 percent in 1960 to
4 percent in 2001 for government assets, and from 4.25 percent to 8.5 percent for private non-
residential assets. In turn, Gupta et al. take into account the diﬀerent composition of capital in
diﬀerent set of nations and adapt those estimates for the period 1960-2008 as follows: for public
capital, the depreciation rate equals 2.5% in LICs, 2.5% rising to 3.4% in MICs and 2.5% rising to
4.3% in Advanced; for private capital, 4.25% in LICs, 4.25% rising to 7.6% in MICs, and 4.25%
rising to 9.6% in Advanced. These last income- and sector-speciﬁc depreciation rates are the ones
that we use in our calculations. For subsequent years, we extrapolated the 2008 ﬁgures. Alternatives
to these baseline assumptions, including a constant rate of 0.5 for the whole period and diﬀerent
time varying proﬁles suggested by other papers only change the capital stocks marginally.
Armed with disaggregated investment and deﬂator data, assumptions on initial conditions and
a pattern of depreciation rates, we apply the perpetual inventory method to construct current price
capital series for each country as follows:
PktKjt = (1− δjt)

Pkt
Pkt−1

Pkt−1Kjt−1 + Ijt−1, (6)
so that
PktKjt = (1− δ)
t

Pkt
Pk0

Ij0
gj + δj0
+
t
i=1
(1− δ)t−i

Pkt
Pk0

Iji−1. (7)
The total capital stock (PkK) is then simply set equal to the sum of the private and public
10Since a negative gj could result in implausibly large or impossibly negative initial conditions, the measure was
bounded at zero. For the core sample of ﬁfty countries, this bounding only aﬀected the public capital initial condition
for Zambia.
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stocks. The capital measures become less sensitive to the initial conditions and investment share
extrapolation as t becomes closer to the present. This suggests that time series results have to be
interpreted with greater care than the cross-section results in 2005.
Having constructed public and private capital stocks, the remaining speciﬁcation choice is that
for income share β. We choose to adopt the cross-country estimates constructed by MSS. This
share data initially derives from Bernanke and Gurkaynak (2001) adjusted, as proposed by CF,
to account for natural capital using wealth data from World Bank (2006). MSS then improve the
measurement of the income share of natural resources used by CF by directly employing natural-
resource rents. Once income from natural capital is removed from capital income, the result is data
on the share of reproducible private capital β.
3 Private MPK Calculation
With the necessary data at hand we turn to calculating each country’s private and overall MPK.
The private MPK is given by expression (4), whereas the overall MPK — CF’s preferred measure —
equals
MPK = β
PyY
PkK
. (8)
As explained in Section 2, our approach is to measure the marginal productivity using current price
data on income and capital along with income share data, whereas CF employed PPP numbers. In
the Appendix, we present Figure 8, which plots MPK obtained using current price data and the
CF capital shares against real-GDP per capita for the exact same cross-section of countries as CF
for the years 1996 and 2005, the former being the year on which CF focus. The Figure shows that
the current price approach yields essentially the same slightly upward-sloping overall MPK as CF.
Moreover, little has changed over the 9-year period 1996-2005. The advanced economies remain
bunched closely around a ﬁnancial rate of return of ten percent while the developing nations have
a similar mean but greater variation, with rates of return from below one to sixteen percent.
Coming back to our main calculations, which employ the MSS benchmark sample and reproducible-
capital shares, Table 2 presents baseline summary statistics for 2005, unless stated otherwise. The
sample originally have 79 nations. However, due to either lack of private and public investment data
or not fulﬁlling our capital-stock quality restriction (see above), our MSS sample is only composed
of 68 countries.11
11 In particular, from the original MSS benchmark sample, we lose Hungary Iceland, Jamaica, Luxembourg, Malta,
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Table 2: Core Sample Summary Statistics
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Table 3: Current Price Public and Private MPK
Measure Year Mean Std. Dev Min Max
MPK 2005 0.159 0.062 0.022 0.394
MPKP 2005 0.240 0.109 0.034 0.615
The charts contained in Figure 2 show the price-corrected private MPK (MPKP ), and the gap
between the private and the overall MPKs (MPKP −MPK) for 1996 (left panels) and 2005 (right
panels). Table 3 shows respective summary statistics for 2005. Four observations are particularly
notable. First and most important, with the MSS shares, the overall MPK is no longer upward
sloping, it is ﬂat. In particular, the ﬁtted lines for theMPK measure (top charts) are insigniﬁcant.
Moreover, when we eliminate the public capital component, we obtain a downward-sloping private
MPK with a statistically signiﬁcant ﬁtted line. Second, there are not qualitative diﬀerences between
the two time periods; nevertheless, the private MPK looks more disperse in 1996 than in 2005.
Third, there is an interesting pattern amongst the advanced economies: the private MPKs are
relatively similar. According to this, the graphs potentially imply that private capital is allocated
eﬃciently in advanced economies, but ineﬃciently in poor countries. Last but not least, public
investment is less eﬃciently allocated in developing nations than in advanced economies. We can
deduce this from the third row of Figure 2 that shows that the dispersion of the gap between
MPKP and MPK is substantially larger in the lower half of the income distribution. This gap is
due to public capital investment. Therefore, the larger dispersion suggests that the public capital
stock can be subject to a larger degree of misallocation in middle and lower income countries —
notice that under MPK equalization two economies with the same income level should have the
same public capital stock if they share the same production technology and input prices.
Figure 3 contains the temporal evolution from 1990 to 2005 of the mean values of the overall
MPK and MPKP (ﬁrst column), and their standard deviation (second column). These results
should be interpreted with care given the greater sensitivity to initial conditions as we go back in
time. The standard deviation of each of the MPKs reﬂects eﬃciency in the distribution of resources
across countries.
Focusing on the ﬁrst column, the annual means have remained more or less constant since 1990
in the full sample (ﬁrst row). This pattern, however, does not hold when we split the sample
Nigeria, Oman, Poland, Taiwan, Trinidad & Tobago and Zimbabwe. The 68 nations that remain are the ones listed
in Table 2.
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Figure 2: The Private MPK
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Figure 3: Mean and Dispersion Time Series
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006
Mean MPK - Full Sample
Overall MPK Private MPK
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006
Standard Deviation of MPK - Full Sample
Overall MPK Private MPK
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006
Mean MPK - Developing Economies
Overall MPK Private MPK
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006
Standard Deviation of MPK - Developing Economies
Overall MPK Private MPK
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006
Mean MPK - Advanced Economies
Overall MPK Private MPK
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006
Standard Deviation of MPK - Advanced Economies
Overall MPK Private MPK
Public and Private MPK 15
into advanced and developing nations.12 In advanced economies (third row), the means have
monotonically increased since 1990; whereas for the developing group (middle row), MPK is fairly
ﬂat and MPKP has declined. The trend in the developed-world private MPK is most likely due
to technical change. The patterns observed in developing nations are, on the other hand, more
diﬃcult to explain and we leave it to future research. The ﬁrst column also shows that the distance
between MPK and MPKP during 1990 to 2005 has changed (declining) only for the developing
group.
The annual standard deviation of the MPK, depicted in the second column of Figure 3, is more
closely related to the concept of capital misallocation. In particular, a falling variation suggests
more eﬃcient allocation of capital worldwide. We see that the overall MPK only shows some
variation (a slight decline) of its standard deviation in advanced economies. The private MPK,
on the other side, experiences a signiﬁcant decrease in both groups — but especially in developing
nations — contributing to diminish the gap between the two MPK measures. Therefore, on average,
private capital has become more eﬃciently allocated across nations since 1990.
4 Public Capital Misallocation
Our next task consists in digging deeper into the large cross-country public capital variation found
by our analysis of the gap between the total and private MPKs. This is an important issue because
it may indicate that the most signiﬁcant loss in world GDP is due to the misallocation of public
capital, not private capital. This challenge requires the use of the public MPK measure MPKG
contained in expression (5).
As we already know, the problem with calculating MPKG is that it is not possible to estimate
γ using national accounts because the public sector performs a non-market activity. To circumvent
this issue, we carry out three exercises. First, we abstract completely from income shares and focus
instead exclusively on the ratio of output to capital (PyY/PkgKg and PyY/PkpKp), a main driving
force of the value and dispersion of the MPK measure. Second, as in Cooley and Prescott (1995),
we assume that the net rate of return between private and public investment is the same; which
allows getting country-speciﬁc values of the share of public capital in output. This second exercise
provides a conservative assessment of the gap between the private and public MPKs. Third, we
employ regression estimates of the output elasticity of public capital to proxy the parameter γ.
12The distinction between advanced and developing economies follows Table 2.
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These regression estimates, except in one case, do not allow for cross-country variation in the
shares, and should tend to overestimate the private-public MPK diﬀerence. Albeit each of them
in isolation are imperfect measures, we believe that taken together provide a possible interval of
variation for the public MPK.
4.1 Counterfactual shares
Results from this ﬁrst approach are displayed in Figure 4. It uses the current price measures of
capital and output as in Figure 2 though with a much enlarged sample size of 130 nations given
that we no longer need income share numbers. To ensure the quality of the capital stock data
only countries with at least 10 investment share observations and 20 observations of the investment
deﬂator are included.
The ﬁrst row of charts show the public (left panel) and private (right panel) components of the
output/capital ratios. The results are striking. For private capital, the familiar relatively constant
and ﬂat shape is obtained. For public capital, however, it is a quite diﬀerent story: the cloud of
points displays a much larger dispersion than the private one (as expected), and is signiﬁcantly
upward sloping.
Following the same method, and in order to further look into the extent of capital misallocation,
we can ask the question: given the observed output to capital ratios, what pattern of public/private
output elasticities would be needed to rationalize the data if the world is one of perfect capital
markets (i.e. with equalized MPKs)? The reader can then think about whether the pattern and
magnitudes seem reasonable given whatever prior on output elasticities is held. Speciﬁcally, we
assume a counterfactual in which the returns are equalized across countries, and across sectors,
opting for r+ δ = 0.13 — that is, an arbitrary number within the interval of MPKP in Table 3. By
taking a stance on this hypothetical equalized return to capital, we can then back out the output
elasticities as βˆ = 0.13/(PyY/PkKp) and γˆ = 0.13/(PyY/PkKg), ensuring that for each country in
2005 we have MPKP =MPKG = 0.13.13
Row two gives the pattern of counterfactual shares consistent with equalized MPKs. A key
aggregate pattern of the public capital share (left chart) is that the hypothetical output elasticity
is low compared to the private one (right panel), especially for high-income economies (above
$35,000 real GDP per worker); in this country group, the average γˆ is 0.07, much smaller than the
13Note that other things equal, the choice of r + δ only aﬀects the scale of the cloud of points, but not its shape.
In particular, a larger choice will lead to larger elasticities, and vice versa.
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Figure 4: Counterfactual and Actual Shares
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mean value of βˆ that equals 0.19.
It is also interesting that the counterfactual elasticities for private capital are relatively similar
across country groups, showing the same average of 0.19 for both high- and low-income economies.
However, the ones for public capital are very diﬀerent, with a mean value of 0.07 for the former
group, 0.15 for the latter, and a strongly signiﬁcant downward sloping relationship with income
levels. In both cases, the heterogeneity amongst developing countries is clearly larger, with a
standard deviation that more than doubles the one of the high-income. A summary observation is
then that for equalized MPKs we, on average, require higher public capital output elasticities in
developing than advanced economies, and similar elasticities for private capital.
At this point, it is important to test whether output elasticities can be considered essentially
constant in the cross-section. If this is the case then output/capital ratios would be informative
about MPK diﬀerences across nations. In order to do that, the ﬁnal row of Figure 4 turns away from
agnosticism and shows national accounts data for the reproducible-capital share (β) in our sample
of 68 countries (right panel) and for the government gross operating surplus share in a subsample of
49 nations (left panel). The later share captures the depreciation of public capital and, therefore,
provides information about one component of γ. Both charts may suggest a slightly negative
relationship of the shares with income, however this relationship is not statistically signiﬁcant.
Taken all these results together, they suggest a common aggregate production function across
countries, and therefore hint at a large misallocation of public capital alongside the relatively
eﬃcient allocation of private capital. These patterns are consistent with proﬁt motives bringing
private capital-output ratios in line across countries and political motives keeping the public capital-
output ratios out of step.
4.2 A Cooley-Prescott approach
So far, we have not tried to give actual values to the output-elasticity of public capital. However,
this is important to get closer to the actual degree of public capital misallocation. In order to
advance in that direction, we ﬁrst take a very conservative view and, following Cooley and Prescott
(1995), assume that the net return to investment is equalized across sectors. This can be justiﬁed
when governments compete with private enterprises in the loanable-funds market to borrow from
private agents and ﬁnance budget deﬁcits. A desirable feature of the method is that it delivers
country-speciﬁc values for γ.
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Figure 5: Public Capital Share and MPKG Under the Cooley-Prescott (1995) Assumption
Suppose that, if output included the whole return to public capital (GDP in national accounts
only includes its depreciation), both the public and the private MPK would only diﬀer due to the
depreciation rate of their respective capital stocks. Under this assumption, we can compute the
share of public capital γ in adjusted income (Yadj) as:
γ = (r + δg)
PkgKg
PyYadj
; (9)
where
PyYadj = PyY + rPkgKg, (10)
and r represents the net return to capital investment. Then expressions (5), (9) and (10) obtain
the marginal product of public capital (that we denote CPMPKG for convenience) as follows:
CPMPKG = (r + δg)

1 + r
PkgKg
PyY
−1
. (11)
In principle, CPMPKG can be bigger or smaller thanMPKP — which equals r+δp by assumption
— depending on the diﬀerence between the two depreciation rates (δp and δg) and the value of the
ratio of public capita to GDP. A higher δg and a smaller ratio will tend to make the public MPK
larger compare to its private counterpart.
We still need to get values for the variable r. From (4), under the cross-sector net-return-
equalization assumption, we can use the CF’s estimates to recover the net return through the
following expression:
r = αF
PyY
PkpKp
− δp. (12)
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Notice that Yadj does not belong to expression (12) because the share of non-reproducible capital
derived by CF is a fraction of GDP, that is, PyY .
Figure 5 presents the results for the core sample. The left panel gives the estimated shares, and
the right one the estimated public MPK. The cloud of the shares provides a negative relationship,
with a ﬁtted line whose slope is signiﬁcant at the 5% level. The public MPK cloud, on the other
hand, still shows a large dispersion, but its ﬁtted line depicts a signiﬁcant negative slope — that is,
the estimated shares more than oﬀset the upward sloping ratio of GDP to public capital. The main
lesson from this second exercise is then that the assumption that the net return of investment in
public and public capital are the same does not leave much room for an increasing public MPK.
An additional result, although not shown in the Figure, is that MPKP is above CPMPKG in
all countries, because the depreciation rate in the private sector is suﬃciently larger (double on
average) than in the public one. These depreciation rate diﬀerences are, therefore, a potential
source of overinvestment in public capital in all nations.
4.3 Regression estimates
The Cooley-Prescott exercise imposes a possible lower bound to the diﬀerence between the marginal
returns to private and public capital. In order to have a wider view, we next resort to production
function estimates of the output elasticity of public capital. This is certainly an imperfect approach
for two reasons: ﬁrst, there are concerns about proper identiﬁcation of the elasticity; second, the
method does not oﬀer suﬃcient heterogeneity in relative shares across countries. On the ﬁrst issue,
while concerns about identiﬁcation are warranted, we oﬀer results for a wide range of economically
plausible output elasticities that leave the main results unchanged. On the second issue, the
equalization of shares across countries does not allow for the oﬀsetting eﬀect displayed by the
downward trend in the left panel of Figure 5, and therefore, as previously mentioned, this exercise
should tend to overestimate public MPK diﬀerences.
A useful reference point to achieve our goal is given by Bom and Ligthart (2014) who perform a
meta-analysis on a sample of 578 estimates from 68 studies carried out from 1983 to 2008 estimating
the private output elasticity of public capital. Even given much variation across the studies, they
ﬁnd the average true output elasticity of public capital to be positive and signiﬁcant — giving
support for the implicit assumption throughout this paper that public capital is productive and
should appear in the production function.
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Figure 6: MPKG Applying Regression Estimates
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To be precise, after correcting for linear publication bias, the unconditional average output elas-
ticity of public capital is found to be 0.106. However, the output elasticity is quite heterogeneous.
In the short run, γ is only 0.083 for public capital installed at the central level of government. This
value increases to 0.193 when long-run estimates of core public capital such as roads and railways
installed by regional and local governments are considered.
Though many of the studies in Bom and Ligthart’s sample are for the US or other advanced
economies, and then can be thought as not completely applicable to our sample, the one study
which focusses on LICs (Dessus and Herrera, 2000) yields a similar output elasticity of 0.13. In
addition, a more recent contribution by Gupta et al. (2014) incorporates a large number of LICs
to their sample. Their approach is to estimate system-GMM panel regressions assuming a Cobb-
Douglas production function with skill-adjusted labor, private and public capital as its arguments.
As shown in columns (2) and (3) in Table 6 of Gupta et al., they estimate a value of γ equal to
0.253 for LICs and 0.167 for middle-income and advanced economies.
Taking these estimates on board, Figure 6 shows results for the sample of 68 countries in 2005
using values of γ equal to the minimum (γ = 0.083, top panels) and average (γ = 0.106, medium
panels) reported by Bom and Ligthart, and the values estimated by Gupta et al. (γ = 0.253 for
LICs and γ = 0.167 for the rest, bottom panels) that provide a γ for LICs larger than the ones
reported by Bom and Ligthart. The left column of charts gives values for MPKG, whereas the
right column provides the ratio of MPKG to MPKP . This last ratio is interesting because we
can look at eﬃciency as requiring not only that marginal returns are equalized across countries,
but also across sectors.
The MPKG plots reproduce the results obtained in Figure 4 for the output/capital ratios, but
this time with a smaller sample. The public MPK increases, on average, with income per worker,
and the slope is signiﬁcant at the 5% level. Results suggest that if there are barriers to the ﬂow
of capital across countries then these obey, on average, upward rigidities in the ﬂow of investment
that ﬁnances public capital.
The ratio of the public to the private return, on the other hand, gives information about how
countries deviate from cross-sector equalization. The natural interpretation (given a benchmark
that the private sector behaves optimally) is that a ratio below one reﬂects a government that
overinvests in public capital, whereas a number above one suggests underinvestment. Regardless
of the value of γ, few nations show values around one — the degree of dispersion is high. Another
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pattern that arises independently of the value of γ is the case for public-capital underinvestment
in advanced economies. Only Japan and Singapore seem to be close to an eﬃcient stock of public
capital when the value of γ is around its average estimate.
The case of underinvestment in also dominant for emerging countries. When the output-
elasticity of public capital takes on 0.083, only 3 out of 42 developing countries in 2005 provide a
ratio below one, making the case for overinvestment in public capital. This number falls to 2 for γ
equals to 0.106, and becomes zero when γ takes on 0.253 in LICs. In all cases, emerging nations
that show overinvestment are always middle income. Hence, we conclude that using regression
estimates most developing countries in the sample suﬀer from underinvestment in public capital.
5 Deadweight Loss Calculations
A direct measure for the eﬃciency loss from capital misallocation is the deadweight loss (DWL
from now on), which we deﬁne here, as in CF, as
N
n=1 (Y
∗
n − Yn)
Yn
, (13)
where Y ∗n is counterfactual GDP with capital (public, private or overall) eﬃciently allocated in
nation n, and N is the number of countries in the sample. The greatest asset of this measure here
is that we can start to quantify the relative loss from public versus private capital misallocation.
The calculations extend the approach of CF to account for complementarity of public and private
capital in the production function.
Assuming that all industries in the country use the same Cobb-Douglas production technology,
we transform expression (1) into the following aggregate production function for country n:
Yn = K
γn
gnK
βn
pnX
1−βn
n , (14)
where all variables and parameters are now country-speciﬁc.
Proﬁt-maximization and price-taking ensure that the following conditions hold for every n:
Pn
PKp
βnK
γn
gnK
βn−1
pn X
1−βn
i = MPKPn, (15)
Pn
PKg
γnK
γn−1
gn K
βn
pnX
1−βn
n = MPKGn. (16)
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In the counterfactual case where the returns to private and public capital (separately) are
equalized across countries, expressions (15) and (16) imply that
Pn
PKp
βnK
γn
gn (K
∗
pn)
βn−1X
1−βn
i = MPKP
∗, (17)
Pn
PKg
γn(K
∗
gn)
γn−1K
βn
pnX
1−βn
n = MPKG
∗. (18)
These conditions can be manipulated to show that the counterfactual capital stocks can be calcu-
lated as
K∗pn =

MPKPn
MPKP ∗
 1
1−βn
Kpn, (19)
K∗gn =

MPKGn
MPKG∗
 1
1−γn
Kgn. (20)
MPKP ∗and MPKG∗ are however unknown. To solve for these, we require an additional resource
constraint — we impose that the aggregate counterfactual private/public capital stock is equal to
the existing aggregate stocks:
N
n=1
K∗pn =
N
n=1
Kpn =
N
n=1

MPKPn
MPKP ∗
 1
1−βn
Kpn, (21)
N
n=1
K∗gn =
N
n=1
Kgn =
N
n=1

MPKGn
MPKG∗
 1
1−γn
Kgn. (22)
We solve for MPKP ∗ and MPKG∗ in equalities (21) and (22) to an accuracy of two decimals.
Once we know the counterfactual equalized MPKs, it is straightforward to ﬁnd counterfactual
capital stocks country-by-country. Counterfactual income with private capital eﬃciently allocated
is then simply
Y ∗n = Yn

K∗pn
Kpn
βn
, (23)
or with eﬃcient allocation of public capital it is
Y ∗n = Yn

K∗gn
Kgn
γn
. (24)
The DWL measure is then calculated as the overall percentage increase in income from capital
reallocation. Since the calculations in this section require comparable capital measures across
countries, we calculate real capital measures using PWT 7.0 data, rather than the current price
local currency measures used for our preferred measures of the MPK.
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Table 4: Deadweight Loss in 2015, Percentage Increase over World’s GDP
No. of
Sample Shares nations MPK MPKP MPKG (γ = 0.106) CPMPKG
CF CF 50 0.40 0.30 8.68 3.48
MSS MSS 68 1.40 1.90 9.32 9.09
Open MSS MSS 46 1.14 1.31 8.56 6.24
Closed MSS MSS 18 1.26 2.14 8.93 15.64
Recalling that CF calculate the deadweight loss to be 0.1 percent of income in 1996 using PWT
6.1 data, we ﬁnd a comparable result with PWT 6.1 data employing the CF 50-country sample and
reproducible-capital shares along with our approach to capital stock construction (which diﬀers
slightly to CF in its initial conditions and depreciation rates assumed) — in particular, we ﬁnd the
deadweight loss to be 0.054 percent of GDP.14 Using the latest PWT 7.0 data on the same CF
sample however, we calculate the deadweight loss for the same year to be 0.41 percent of income;
that is, the update to the data itself yields an update to the deadweight loss.
Our interest is more in ﬁnding the DWL by sector, for two reasons. Firstly, the ﬁgure of
0.1 percent (or 0.41 percent) could understate the actual DWL if public and private capital are
complements in the production function. The simplest intuition is that a completely ﬂat overall
MPK schedule (DWL of zero) could conceal an upward-sloping public MPK oﬀset by a downward-
sloping private MPK (positive DWL in each sector). Secondly, we are interested in quantifying the
diﬀerence in eﬃciency losses between the sectors.
The calculations are presented in Table 4. Rows 2 and 3 conﬁrms our priors. In 2005, using
PWT 7.0 data, the CF sample and shares — which are used just on this occasion for comparison —
deliver an overall deadweight loss of 0.40 percent, very close to the 1996 value of 0.41. Once capital
is disaggregated, the deadweight loss in the private sector (assuming the allocation of public capital
unchanged) to be only 0.30 percent, whilst the loss from public capital misallocation goes from 3.48
to 8.68 percent, depending on whether we use the Cooley-Prescott assumption or the Bom and
Ligthart’s average (0.106) for γ, respectively.15 These numbers represent a substantial gain from
14Actually, CF core sample is composed of 52 nations. We lose Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago due to a lack of
recent investment data covering these countries.
15Comparing the middle-right chart in Figure 2 (MPKP ) to the right panel in Figure 5 (CPMPKG), it is
not evident why the DWL from private capital is substantially smaller than from public capital. Notice that, for
example, the cloud of points for CPMPKG seems to be more compressed than the one for the private MPK. The key
to understand the result is that the CPMPKG average is also smaller, which makes CPMPKG have a coeﬃcient
of variation 30% higher than the one for MPKP .
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public capital reallocations.
Coming back to our 68-country sample and the MSS shares, it is interesting to compare our
results to the ones in the MSS paper. MSS only study misallocation due to total non-reproducible
capital. We get a DWL of 1.40 percent for overall capital in 2005 (row 3 in Table 4), whereas
MSS ﬁnd a 2 percent for the same year. The diﬀerent value obtained can be a consequence of the
reduction from 79 to 68 in the number of countries that compose the benchmark sample, or from
the diﬀerent version of the PWT employed — they use PWT 8.0. Row 3 also implies that, compare
to the CF case, the loss from overall capital and public capital misallocation (CPMPKG case)
almost triples: they rise from 0.40 and 3.48 percent to 1.40 and 9.09 percent, respectively. For the
private MPK, the impact is more striking, it experiences a 6-fold increase, from 0.30 to 1.90 per
cent. Perhaps more importantly, the DWL from public capital misallocation remains much larger
than from private capital, the former is at least 4.8 times larger.
6 Robustness check
In this section, we carry out an experiment to see how the results about the direction and degree of
capital misallocation change. We study whether policy distortions can be behind the discrepancy in
the MPK across countries. In particular, following MSS, we employ the openness indicator originally
developed by Sachs and Warner (1995) and later extended by Wacziarg and Welch (2008). The
indicator takes on 1 if a country is classiﬁed as open and 0 otherwise. As argued by Rodriguez and
Rodrik (2000), among many others, the beauty of this indicator is that it reﬂects a range of policies
and institutional diﬀerences that go further beyond the degree of international trade liberalization.
Figure 7 and rows four and ﬁve in Table 4 provide results when the sample is split into open
and closed economies through the adjusted openness indicator constructed by Wacziarg and Welch
(2008).16 We see that for closed economies (left column) the ﬁtted lines show signiﬁcant positive
slopes and call for upward frictions in the international ﬂow of capital.17 It is the set of open
16A country is classiﬁed as closed in the 1990s if it displayed at least one of the following ﬁve characteristics: (1)
average tariﬀ rates of 20 percent or more; (2) nontariﬀ barriers covering 20 percent or more of trade; (3) a black
market exchange rate at least 10 percent lower than the oﬃcial exchange rate; (4) a state monopoly on major exports;
and (5) a socialist economic system (as deﬁned by Kornai 1992). In the original Sachs and Warner (1995) criteria,
the thresholds for (1), (2) and (3) were 40, 40 and 20 percent, respectively. The reason to choose the adjusted instead
of the original openness indicator is that using the latter the number of countries classiﬁed as closed in our sample
was too small.
17The 18 economies classiﬁed as closed are Burkina Faso, Brazil, China, Cote d‘Ivoire, Cyprus, Dominican Republic,
Indonesia, India, Iran, Kenya, Republic of Korea, Sri Lanka, Morocco, Paraguay, Senegal, Thailand, Tunisia and
Tanzania. The rest of countries in the sample are considered open.
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Figure 7: MPKs for Close and Open Nations
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economies the one responsible for the patterns obtained previously. As in previous sections, the
ﬁrst row shows that the private MPK is downward-sloping. So is the public MPK obtained with
the Cooley-Prescott approach; it is, however, upward sloping using regression estimates.
In terms of DWL (see Table 4), the message does not change either: the loss from capital
misallocation is much larger for public capital than for private capital. Nevertheless, we ﬁnd some
diﬀerences between countries classiﬁed as open (row four) and closed (row ﬁve). Closed economies
show a higher DWL and the diﬀerence between the DWL induced by private and public capital is
also larger. More speciﬁcally, the DWL is 1.31 and 2.14 percent for private capital (column 5) in
open and closed nations, respectively; those numbers become 6.24 and 15.64 when the CPMPKGs
(column 7) are equalized across countries, which represent 4.8 and 7.3 folds compare to their private
capital counterparts.
7 Conclusion
Caselli and Feyrer (2007) deliver an intriguing result: after appropriately adjusting the share and
relative price of capital, the overall MPK is shown to be broadly the same across a large group of
advanced and developing economies, casting doubt on the international capital frictions explanation
of the Lucas Paradox, and leaving not much room for international physical-capital misallocation.
Motivated by the extensively documented and remarkable diﬀerences between public and private
sector incentives, especially in developing countries, we have attempted in this paper to unpack the
overall MPK into its public and private components.
Given the diﬃculties associated with the calculation of the output share of public capital and its
importance for the public MPK measure, we have followed two approaches that together generate
possible upper and lower bounds for the diﬀerence between the public and private MPKs in each
nation. One of them supposes that net returns are equalized between the public and private
sector in each economy (the lower bound). The other adopts regression-based estimates under the
assumption that the output-elasticity of public capital γ is relatively stable in the cross section of
countries (the upper bound).
Our results have been the following. First, using data from WDI, WEO and PWT 7.0, and the
MSS capital shares, we have shown that the cross country schedule of the total MPK is ﬂat with
respect to income-per-worker levels. Second, and this is our key result, we have shown that even
though the private MPK turns out to be negatively sloped, the deadweight loss from private capital
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misallocation is relatively small, about 1.9 percent of global GDP in 2005. Therefore, in terms of the
Lucas paradox, our results suggest that private capital is allocated remarkably eﬃciently. Third,
we have found that the deadweight loss from public capital misallocation can be substantial, much
larger than the one from cross-country diﬀerences in the return to private capital. In particular,
public MPK diﬀerences across countries produce a loss in global GDP of 9 percent in our most
conservative scenario where we assume that the net returns to investment in public and private
capital are equalized.
Searching for the roots of the diﬀerences in the public MPK across countries, we have split
the sample into open and closed economies. This exercise has revealed that, for closed economies,
the cost of public capital misallocation can be substantially larger than for open ones. Another
important result from this exercise is that previous ﬁndings hold, except for closed economies,
where the case for upward frictions in the international ﬂow of private capital is supported.
Our approach also suggests a reﬁnement of the outlook on aid presented in Caselli and Feyrer
(2007). Caselli and Feyrer presented a skeptical view on aid, concluding that greater ﬂows of
aid would only be displaced by capital outﬂows, given the ﬂat MPK. Our disaggregation brings
an alternative view. Given imperfect substitutability between private and public capital in the
production function, investment in public capital may lead not to capital outﬂows, but inﬂows of
private capital, since the greater stock of public capital raises the returns to private capital.
This alternative view may be ﬁtting too close with a story of Tanzania’s ability to attract foreign
capital. Taking a walk in the busy streets of Dar es Salaam, the capital city, one is impressed by
the vibrant private economic activity, entrepreneurship and the many bank branches (local and
multinational) scattered across town. One gets the favorable impression that, although at embryonic
stages, the private sector operates under close proximity to “market” conditions. A look at public
goods (e.g. rail roads and ports) and the provision of public services (e.g. power generation) signals
clear deﬁciencies. Experts correctly insist on the major progress, including in the public sector,
that Tanzania has been through over the last two decades as captured by the country’s seven
percent average GDP growth. But by all accounts this progress is not sustainable unless capital
starts to ﬂow inwards from abroad. This paper points to public sector frictions, such as public-
infrastructure investment mismanagement, rather than ﬁnancial frictions or complementarities to
low human capital or TFP as the key constraint to enhancing the MPK, and with it, accelerating
international capital inﬂows.
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Still, our public MPK results should be consider tentative due to the strong assumptions made.
There is still much work to be done to improve measurement of the return to public capital in-
vestment. In this paper, we have just started to scratch the surface to understand public capital
allocations across countries. Nonetheless, we have clearly shown that aggregate estimates can pro-
vide a very good start in this line of research and that existing aggregate datasets are adequate for
taking on the task; but such aggregate estimates should be compared against micro evidence which
are as crucially important in understanding the pattern of capital ﬂows.
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Figure 8: CF Results with Current Price Data
